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SYNOPSIS
This paper is an historical survey of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. The author reviews Chinese 
migration to the Indonesian archipelago in the pre-colonial era, the forces that stimulated con-
version to Islam, and the hybrid cultures that emerged from this process. The effects of the co-
lonial and post-colonial periods on this process are also examined. Finally, the author focuses 
on the role of post-colonial organizations in challenging, defending and/or asserting new his-
torical, Islamic and Chinese identities.
Introduction
When asked in 1979, Junus Jahja, a prominent Chi-
nese Muslim leader, who was born and had lived for 
long in Indonesia, expressed his self-identity as: “I am 
a Muslim, an Indonesian, and a Chinese.”1  This per-
sonal statement illustrates not only how an individual 
can simultaneously be Muslim, nationalist, and Chi-
nese, but also raises an important question relating to 
the studies of Diaspora: How did Chinese Muslims 
identify themselves in Indonesia, during the colonial 
and post-colonial periods?2  This article seeks to exam-
ine what it meant to be a Chinese Muslim in 
Indonesia.3 It mainly argues that many Chinese Mus-
lims in Indonesia were hardly “diasporic” because they 
felt that conversion to Islam was the way of assimilating 
to local Indonesian culture.  Here I would coin the term 
“post-diasporic experience” to refer to the situation 
where Chinese Muslims were born in Indonesia and 
thought of new boundary identification beyond their 
homeland and sought to assimilate with the “local.” 
“Post-diasporic Chinese” also means that they wanted 
to challenge or counter the “diasporic Chinese” iden-
tity. “Identities,” in plural form, implies that Chinese 
who converted to Islam had different and changing 
identities according to changing circumstances.4 
This paper begins with an historical survey of Chi-
nese Muslims from the Dutch colonial era and then 
discusses Chinese Muslim identities in post-
independence Indonesia by focusing on some Chinese 
Muslim individuals and organizations.
The Experience of Chinese Muslims in 
the Dutch Colonial Era 
Southeast Asia has been among the most attractive 
destinations for Chinese to migrate and to live. There 
have been a variety of reasons why Chinese left their 
homes:  political, religious, economic, or a combination 
of all.5 Nearly all the “overseas Chinese” were not from 
the Han center of China, but from the peripheral re-
gions of Fujian and Guangdong.6 But most of the Chi-
nese in Southeast Asia decided to settle in the new 
countries.7 This migration pattern affected the ways in 
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which Chinese expressed their identities in the host 
countries. 
In the pre-World War II era, prior to Indonesia’s 
independence in 1945,  many of the Chinese in the 
Netherlands East Indies came to identify themselves 
with their homeland, China. These Chinese were later 
called Totok (originally meant ‘full-blooded’). Totok 
Chinese were apparently “diasporic” in the sense that 
they still had strong attachment to their homeland. 
However, the Peranakan Chinese, who had lived in the 
Netherlands East Indies for a long time, had lost much 
of their Chinese culture and no longer spoke Chinese, 
and could thus be regarded as post-diasporic Chinese.8 
Many mixed marriages had taken place, and the Per-
anakan had become part of their local society. But 
because the colonial state and society put much em-
phasis on the concept of “race,” the Indonesian people 
were not “free” and the Indonesian nation was experi-
encing a flood of new Chinese immigration, hence 
Chinese communities were split along racial and po-
litical lines. A Chinese figure, Tjoe Bou San, for exam-
ple,  was oriented toward China and believed that the 
only road open to the Chinese was that of “Chinese 
nationalism.” Kwee Hing Tjiat,  on the other hand, put 
forward the idea of “total assimilation” with native 
Indonesians. However,  before World War II, Indone-
sian nationalism was still weak among many of  the Chi-
nese. The idea of Indonesian nationalism did not gain 
strength among the Chinese until Indonesian inde-
pendence in 1945.9 In short, during the colonial pe-
riod, two general types of Chinese had been discerned 
in Indonesia: the “pure-blood Chinese” (Totok) and 
“half-blood Chinese” (Peranakan), but the Totok 
gained greater supports.10  Consequently, debates 
among these groups took place. 
However, the Peranakan had actually existed long 
before Indonesian independence in 1945. Assimilation 
had long taken place. Some historical evidences show 
that there had been significant numbers of Muslim 
Chinese individuals before World War II. French his-
torians, Denys Lombard and Claudine Salmon, for 
example, have drawn our attention to some historical 
evidence which shows that the Chinese had been able 
to assimilate to Indonesian local culture since the fif-
teenth century. The Chinese Muslim named Ma Huan, 
who accompanied Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho,  1371-
1431/3, also known by the name of Sam Po) on his se-
ries of expeditions to the South Seas/ Indian Ocean 
(1405-1437),  reported at the time of their passage 
through East Java that the population was already made 
up of three groups of people:  natives, Muslims (Hui-
hui), and Chinese (Tangren, many of whom were Mus-
lims).  Ma Huan reported that the natives had tousled 
hair and bare feet and worshiped ghosts; the Muslims 
were foreign (mostly Indian and Arab) traders that 
wore clean dress and ate good food. According to Ma 
Hun, the Chinese came during the Tang Dynasty era 
(627-906 C.E) from the cities of Guangdong, Chang-
chou, Chuan-chou and others.11
In China itself,  Muslim communities had existed at 
Canton as far back as the 9th century or earlier and 
Muslim merchants  played a crucial role in coastal 
towns of China, such as Canton and Quanzhou in the 
13th and 14th centuries. These Chinese merchants had 
commercial and cultural contacts with people in 
Champa and Java.12  Chinese Muslims in the 9th century 
fled to Southeast Asia because of political chaos in 
China. Muslims, Jews,  Christians, and Persians in Can-
ton had to leave their homeland and find new settle-
ments. Many of them went to Java.13  A Javanese histo-
rian, Slamet Muljana, used these stories and other evi-
dence (such as documents found in two temples: 
Klenteng Sam Po Kong in Semarang and Klenteng Ta-
lang in Cirebon) to suggest that the Chinese them-
selves also participated in the Islamization of Java.14  A 
controversial book, a Javanese text, called Serat Der-
magandul, considered some of the Muslim 
missionaries/saints in Java (walis) to be of  Chinese 
origin (Peranakan).15  The well-known Portuguese 
traveler Tomé Pires observed that the Javanese used to 
have contacts with the Chinese and that Islam had been 
widespread among the cosmopolitan population of the 
coastal areas,  made up of Chinese, Arabs, Gujaratis, 
Bengalis, and other nationalities.16 Hence, when the 
Dutch came in the 16th century, many Chinese already 
lived in the archipelago. Moreover, many of them had 
been Muslim and played a crucial role in the Islamiza-
tion of Java and other islands in the archipelago.17
From the end of the 16th century, the account of the 
first Dutch fleet makes it clear that one must distin-
guish “pure-blood Chinese”, Totok, that is, those re-
maining loyal to their ancestral religion and region, 
from those who have lived here for a long time and who 
have adopted the Mohammedan faith.  Edmund Scott 
(1603-5) had a report on these two kinds of Chinese: 
“The Chyneses (sic) are very craftie (sic) people in trad-
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ing, using all kind of cosoning (sic) and deceit which 
may possible be devised.  They have no pride in them, 
nor will refuse any labour, except they turne (sic) 
Javans (as many of  them doe when they have done a 
murther (sic) or some other villanie (sic).”18 Another 
Dutch report in 1617 stated that,  according to the Java-
nese themselves, he uses as his  counsel nothing but 
greedy, false thieves: shaven Chinese.19  At Makassar 
(Sulawesi), a local chronicle alludes to a family de-
scended from a Chinese Muslim and says of his origins 
as follows: 
They were two brothers, originating from the land 
of the Huihui (that is Muslims come from China), 
the elder was called Panlaoetia, the younger Laitji, 
both of them had left their country after disap-
pointments. They had boarded boats and migrated 
towards Cirebon in Java. There Laitji married the 
daughter of the Tumenggung (high-ranking admin-
istrative officer) of Batang (to the east of Pekalon-
gan), after which they shared their fortune and Pan-
laoetia asked his younger brother for permission to 
continue his voyage in the direction of the east as 
far as Makassar and up to the land of Sanrabone. 
There he stayed and sought to earn a living by all 
means possible.20 
While the previous centuries had scattered historical 
evidence the eighteenth century had more sources on 
the existence of Chinese Muslims. Thomas Horsfield 
(1848) wrote on the Chinese Muslims who exploited 
the tin mines at Bangka as follows: 
Several families, the names of the heads of which 
are recorded by the inhabitants of Minto (Muntok), 
formed the first stock of colonization; the chief of 
these was the father-in-law of Raden Lumbu (i.e. 
Sultan Badr al-Din); they were of Chinese descent, 
but their ancestors for several generations had em-
braced the Mahomedan (sic)…the physiognomy of 
the present generation evidently indicates their 
Chinese derivation… 21
It was a habit of  the Sultans of Palembang to marry 
one of the daughters of these worthy people of 
Muntok.22  For Palembang, Sumatera, Storm van’s 
Gravesande reported that the Chinese who converted 
to Islam “distinguish themselves, like elsewhere,  by 
their dress, their morals, and their religion,  but more 
than anywhere else in the Indies, they were attracted to 
local dress, and it has resulted in a large number of 
them becoming Muslims in the course of  time; many of 
the Palembangese have, moreover, in the past, like 
today, married Chinese.  Most of these Chinese women 
are of Muslim religion.”23  For Java,  there are more 
examples of Muslims of Chinese origin. Lombard and 
Salmon talk about the family of  Surabaya who con-
verted to Islam and assimilated into the surrounding 
Javanese society to the point of “forgetting” their 
origin.24 For Semarang, Java, there was a report sug-
gesting the existence of kampung Peranakan (local-
born Chinese village): 
As the Parnakkangs (sic) have become Mohamme-
dans or are by birth, they live more in the style of 
the country than in the Chinese way. Their job is 
generally fishing and the navy, hiring themselves 
out of sailors or skippers of entire vessels…they are 
whiter than the normal to be Javanese but not as 
white as the Chinese. They marry Javanese women; 
this results in mixed blood which becomes less so 
from generation to generation.25
The increasing Peranakan Muslim community 
merged into or mixed with the local Indonesian socie-
ties from the second half of the 19th century onwards.26 
For example, a fair number of Chinese Muslims par-
ticipated in local anti-colonial wars. Raden Prawiro 
allied with a Chinese Muslim named Boengseng in an 
uprising in 1839 against the Dutch. Boengseng spoke 
native and Arabic languages and concealed himself  
under an Arab costume.27  Another case concerns Ibu 
Melati,  a shaman of  Chinese origin, who helped an 
uprising in Tangerang in 1924.28 Another demonstra-
tion of Chinese participation in nationalist movements 
was when different youth organizations proclaimed 
The Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) on 28 October 
1928.  Although no Chinese organization was involved, 
a young Chinese Peranakan named Johan Muhammad 
Chai, a delegation from the Young Islamiten Bond, 
signed the Oath.29  Other Chinese, who were non-
Muslims, were also present in the meeting.30 
The early part of  the twentieth century also witnessed 
an increasing movement of Islamic propagation (dak-
wah) by Chinese Muslims. In Sulawesi, there was  Ong 
Kie Ho, the founder of an Islamic Party. In Medan, Haji 
Yap A Siong (d.1984), alias Haji Abdussomad, born in 
Canton at the end of the 19th century, propagated Islam 
in Medan, Sumatera and in 1936 founded the Muslim 
Chinese Union (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa).  The Mus-
lim Chinese Union, according to a local newspaper 
dated November 3, 1936, received land to be used as a 
center of Islamic propagation. In 1938, it is reported, 
the union’s membership totaled 4,800 people in Pa-
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lembang, and 9,500 in Jakarta. 31  The Indonesian Is-
lamic Chinese Party published a magazine called Wasi-
lah (Medium), issued on 1936 for the first time with 
Tjoa Goan Lian and Tan Kim Peng as chief-editors.32 
In Makassar, Liem Kie Chie founded another party, 
The Indonesian Islamic Chinese Party (Partai Tiong-
hoa Islam Indonesia) which was aimed at increasing 
the prestige of Chinese Indonesians through 
Islamization. 33
It is worth discussing the belief that Chinese Muslims 
contributed little to nationalist movements during the 
colonial era.  It has been argued that such Islamic or-
ganizations as the Sarekat Islam (Union of Islam) were 
founded in 1912 to attack,  rather than accommodate, 
Chinese interests. Leo Suryadinata, for example, ar-
gued that the Sarekat Islam aimed to protect their 
business interests against Chinese competition. He 
believed that it was anti-Chinese, and never appealed 
to the Peranakan Chinese.34  Chinese Muslims in 
coastal areas in East Java, for example, were said to 
hold the position as regent (bupati) under the VOC 
system. 35 
Thus, the colonial era witnessed a gradual growth in 
the numbers of Chinese Muslims; some had been Mus-
lim before coming to Indonesia, but many converted to 
Islam during their stay in the country. After they be-
came Muslim, they participated in religious movements 
in different local areas. 
Hybrid Cultures, Diverse Religiosities 
In different places,  the Chinese Peranakan Muslims 
developed “hybrid cultures,” combining local, 
Islamic/Arabic, and Chinese attributes or elements. 
These were made possible largely because the Dutch 
colonial state did not seem to have prohibited Chinese 
cultural expressions. The Chinese shaped the architec-
tural culture of the mosque (masjid). Many mosques 
had architecture, décor or furnishings by Chinese arti-
sans. For example, the old mosques in Jepara and in 
Maluku showed a circular door in the style of the gar-
dens of Suzhou. Other mosques had pulpits (mimbar) 
whose décor, adorned with gilded wood, revealed the 
techniques of the Cantonese cabinet-makers.36 In Ban-
ten, the Pacinan Mosque (Mesjid Pecinan), which re-
mained in 1902, had a European minaret and Chinese 
ornaments.37 Another mosque, Mesjid Jami Angke in 
Jakarta, had some Chinese ornaments on its gate and 
ropes like that of Chinese temple (kelenteng).38 Tradi-
tional drums called bedug, a percussion instrument for 
calling prayers,  could also be found there. To hang the 
drums on part of mosque building might be a Chinese 
architectural influence. This practice has been adopted 
outside the Chinese Muslim community in Java and 
other parts of Indonesia.39 
Apart from the mosques, one also finds a large num-
ber of sacred tombs attributed to Muslims of Chinese 
origin. For example, in a mosque in Angke district,  a 
Muslim tombstone was found with a Chinese inscrip-
tion. A tomb which dated back to 1792 near the Mosque 
of Kebon Jeruk, used Chinese and Arabic words, with 
dragons and other Chinese ornaments. 40 Many of the 
holy tombs were built in an Islamic style,  with a stele at 
the two extremities, but some have kept the Chinese 
model in the form of a tumulus. 41
Chinese Muslims also contributed to local literary 
development. Their Chinese origins can only be traced 
if  the authors reveal it themselves in the introduction 
or in the course of the work. The use of reading rooms 
(taman bacaan) – attested to in China under the Tang 
Dynasty (618-907) – was found in the Indonesian ar-
chipelago, in towns such as Palembang and Jakarta. We 
also know of the famous copyist,  Ching Sa’id Allah 
Muhammad, who transcribed a great number of manu-
scripts while employed at the secretarial office at Bata-
via in the second half of the 19th century. 42 
By the colonial era, Chinese Muslims had demon-
strated a variety of religious orientations too. As ex-
pressed in the local literature, three tendencies of the 
Chinese Muslims during the nineteenth century can be 
identified: Kejawen or Javanese mysticism, Islamic 
orthodoxy, and political militancy.  The first tendency, 
Javanese mysticism, was represented by Serat Tasawuf 
or “mystical treatise” which claimed to teach some 
knowledge of Islamic religion (bab kawroeh agami 
Islam), but adopted Javanese ideas. Another work in 
this Javanese mystic line was a poem called Sjair Ilmoe 
Sedjati dan Sjair Nasehat  or a “Poem about the True 
Knowledge and Poem of Admonition” re-edited in 1921 
by Tan Khoen Swie at Kediri, East Java and attributed 
to Kyai Kiem Mas (1834-96). Kyai  Keim Mas was a 
member of the great Han family and a convert to Islam, 
but he endorsed a type of Javanese syncretism. 
The second tendency was Islamic orthodoxy, repre-
sented by the work entitled Sair Tjioko dan Petjoen or 
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“Poem on the Ghost Festival and Boat Races Festival”, 
containing technical Hokkien terms, but also critical 
statements of perceived “Chinese superstition.” The 
anonymous author, who was a Chinese Peranakan 
converted to Islam, described different great festivals 
of the Javanese community:  first, the Ghost Festival 
(the Avalambana of the Buddhists,  usually called Pesta 
rebutan or Tjioko in Java); second, that of the boat 
races or Petjoen (Pecun), which are to commemorate 
the death of the famous poet and loyal minister Qu 
Yuan (B.C. 332-295);  finally,  that of the Chinese New 
Year of Capgome. The author criticized the “supersti-
tious Chinese” and the “unscrupulous Muslims” who 
came together in the festivals. The author, for example, 
lamented seeing his fellow Muslims hurl themselves at 
the offerings exposed on the scaffolding to snatch them 
(tjioko,  literally “to scramble for the offerings made to 
the ghosts”): 
Here they are united, these insane Muslims
Swallowing their saliva and shaking their heads….
They also gobble down Chinese food,
There are lots of vegetables and pork…
And if there is alcohol in a bowl,
They waste no time in lapping it up…
The Muslim women gather,
All against the Sengke and the Peranakan,
What aberrant morals!
By the riverbanks, they all eat together…
The Chinese eat, the others gorge themselves,
The Chinese bathe, the others paddle,
The Chinese celebrate their New Year, and they get 
drunk….43
The third tendency of Chinese Muslim orientation 
was the political, as exemplified by the work of the Sair 
Serikat Islam or “Poem on the Sarekat Islam”, pub-
lished at Batavia by Kho Tjeng Bie in 1913. Sarekat 
Islam was an Islamic organization established by Is-
lamic traders and landlords in 1912 to strengthen Mus-
lim economic and political networks and to break the 
Chinese commercial monopoly.  Making repeated ref-
erences to Muslim faith (Bismillahi itoe permoelaan 
kalam or “in the name of  God, such is  the beginning”), 
the text “Poem on the Sarekat Islam” was addressed to 
a converted Peranakan public and makes an apology 
on behalf of Sarekat Islam which had just come into 
existence. However, the following text indicates a criti-
cism of  the perception that Sarekat Islam was aimed at 
challenging or attacking the Chinese.44 It implies that 
the author might be one of the members of the Sarekat 
Islam or at least was sympathetic with the organization. 
And still at Keputran [district of Surabaya] in Java, 
The natives fought with the Chinese,
Several have lost their lives,
And the Sarekat lost face.
The Muslim nation
Has suffered for decades,
Throughout the country and in the heart of the vil-
lages,
It is as if one was being tortured.
Many have told 
At the time of the events in Semarang,
That the Sarekat Islam had clearly said
That they were going to attack the Chinese.
All these mad words,
It is to be hoped that you do not listen to them.45 
Apart from such local literature, Chinese Muslims 
had also translated the Arabic Koran into Chinese lan-
guage since the seventeenth century. But the Chinese 
translations didn’t appear until 1932 by Wang Wen-
tjhing, then in 1943 by Liu Tjin-piao, again in 1946 by 
Wang Tjing-tjai and in 1947 by Yang Tjung-ming.46 
These translations show how some attempts at translat-
ing religious books had been made to bridge the gap 
between Chinese converts and their religious scrip-
tures. 
Thus, by the early twentieth century,  there had been 
different orientations among the Chinese Peranakan 
Muslims;  some of them tended to be more consciously 
religious (“orthodox”) than others (“syncretic” or 
“hybrid”), but some were more political in tone. Such 
diversity in religiosity indicated that Chinese Muslims 
had assimilated to the local cultures in a variety of ways. 
Related to religious orientations was language, an issue 
we shall discuss in the following paragraphs. 
Most Chinese Muslims from the nineteenth century 
onwards used Malay language, rather than Chinese or 
Arabic language. The Chinese Muslims – as part of the 
Peranakan - were characterized by a loss of compe-
tence in Chinese languages and the adoption of the 
lingua franca (Malay) as well as the regional/local lan-
guages (such as Javanese). As Ellen Rafferty pointed 
out,  the Chinese Peranakan learned to speak lan-
guages that were useful and accessible to them, and 
they chose as their home language the most advanta-
geous one. Generally speaking, the majority of Per-
anakan did not maintain their original language, for 
only the elite were able to hire tutors from China. 47  
The elite continued attachment to their homeland and 
its culture, and were in a strong economic position as 
intermediaries between the higher-level European 
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economy and the lower level Indonesian one.48 For the 
elite, only after 1875 did Hokkien-language schools  
became popular in Indonesia,  and 217 such schools 
were operating in Java and Madura by 1899.49 Dutch-
Chinese schools (HCS) were established in 1908. 
However, among the graduates from HCS were Chi-
nese who later converted to Islam in the postcolonial 
period. However, most of the Chinese Peranakan did 
not have the chance to learn Chinese or Dutch. In-
stead, they spoke Malay or a local language. 
The Commissie voor de Volkslectuur (Balai Pustaka), 
which emerged from the Office of Native Affairs, was 
established to further spread Romanized Malay (rumi) 
among the inhabitants of the Indies, following up on 
the vigorous activities of the rumi presses under Eura-
sians and Chinese Peranakan from 1856. 50 Chinese 
Peranakan had learned the Malay language, and it was 
through this knowledge of Malay that some of them 
converted to Islam. Thus, Malay language became the 
language of local Islam in the Netherlands East Indies. 
In the following, we shall address the perceptions of 
outsiders toward Chinese Muslims during the colonial 
era. 
Dutch Perceptions of Chinese Muslims
Dutch officials usually called Chinese Muslims 
“geschoren Cineezen” (shaved Chinese with a pigtail, 
orang-orang Tionghoakuciran). In Banten, West Java, 
Chinese Muslims were commonly bald-headed with a 
pigtail. They also wore local dress and sometimes had a 
local name. The Dutch called them also “getornden 
Chineezen” (the Chinese who have changed). These 
terms, however, later underwent a shift in connotation. 
Geschoren Chineezen came to mean “the Chinese who 
have just come with pigtail on their heads,” and Chi-
nese Muslims came to be called Peranakan. The Per-
anakan later referred to a person whose mother was a 
local women but whose father was Chinese.51 In 1874 in 
Sumenep, Madura, there were some 40 Chinese Mus-
lims called Peranakan. They lived local life, using local 
name and wearing local dress. The Dutch officials ini-
tially regarded them as the natives, but later on classi-
fied them as Chinese.52 
In terms of civil status, the Dutch colonials created 
three racial categories: Europeans (Dutch), Foreign 
Orientals (mainly Chinese, also Arabs), and Natives 
(Inlanders).53  Each group was governed by different 
laws and had different rights. The local Chinese were 
considered to be “native” for legal purposes, such as 
when a Muslim married a Chinese woman, and subject 
to local courts, but considered as “non-natives” when 
the Chinese, for example,  intended to own farmland.54 
In Batavia,  the Chinese were required to pay higher 
taxes than the native population. If  the Chinese became 
Muslim, they were looked upon and treated in the same 
way as natives. In 1755, however, the Dutch specified 
that Chinese Muslims would be required to continue 
paying taxes and they would not be given freedom to 
travel.  In Banten, for example, conversion to Islam did 
not immediately reflect on societal status: they still had 
to pay higher tax and only the children of these Chi-
nese converts would legally be native or local. These 
regulations, as Dutch scholar Karel Steenbrink argued, 
were issued to keep the Chinese from becoming 
Muslims. 55
Although many Chinese (including the government 
of China) felt that they were being discriminated 
against by the Dutch colonial government, the Dutch 
still viewed the Chinese as being higher in status than 
the natives.  Chinese were seen as “hard workers” and 
the natives as “lazy”.  For example, Jan Pieterson Coen, 
the founder of the Dutch colony in Batavia, enthused, 
“there are no other people who can serve us better than 
the Chinese.” Coen sought to get Chinese immigrants 
and sent expeditionary parties to kidnap Chinese from 
the Chinese mainland.56 
Thus, generally speaking, the Dutch viewed the Chi-
nese Muslims as a group between the Chinese (foreign 
orientals) and the Muslim natives (inlanders). The 
Dutch sometimes regarded them as Chinese so that 
they could impose higher taxes on them, but in other 
times they could view the Chinese Muslims as simply 
“natives.” The Dutch racial distinction contributed to 
the tense relationships between the Chinese and the 
natives in later periods. But now, we will consider the 
attitudes of fellow Chinese toward Chinese converts. 
Non-Muslim Chinese Perceptions of 
Chinese Muslims
In many cases,  Dutch attitudes toward Chinese and 
natives on the one hand, and the actual conversion of 
some Chinese to Islam on the other, caused tension 
among the Chinese populations. Thus, the Totok Chi-
nese who remained loyal to the traditions of their an-
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cestors in China looked unfavorably upon the holy 
tombs (kramat), which they called shengmu and saw as 
a sign of merging into a foreign society (ru fan).57 As 
Denys Lombard and Claudine Salmon suggested, most 
of these holy tombs were in an Islamic style, “with a 
stele at the two extremities, but a few kept the Chinese 
model in the form of a tumulus.”58 The development of 
collective ancestral temples and funeral associations in 
significant numbers led Chinese communities to stop 
the Islamization process.59 In addition,  the rules of the 
association in Surabaya in 1864 by the Peranakan Chi-
nese of Fujian were aimed to regulate the question of 
marriages and funerals in the heart of their community, 
to warn members against the cults  of  Muslim tombs in 
which the Chinese took part, as well as against the se-
lamatan, or religious meal and communal feast, an-
other practice which became equally common in cer-
tain Peranakan circles.60 Moreover,  Chinese overseas 
nationalists during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries also sought to “re-sinicize” the Peranakan, 
and to prevent other Chinese immigrants from being 
converts. 
In the colonial society, Islam was commonly associ-
ated with a lower socio-economic group and hence not 
attractive to many Chinese. The Chinese convert, Ab-
dul Karim Oey (Oei Tjeng Hien), whom we shall dis-
cuss again below, told the story of his conversion dur-
ing the colonial period. Oei was born in Padang,  Su-
matera in 1905, and converted to Islam in 1930. When 
he proclaimed his new religion, the chief and the com-
munity around him in Bengkulu mocked him severely 
and boycotted his activities. Even his father stopped 
acknowledging him as his son. His father once said, 
“You are a well-to-do person, from a good family, why 
do you enter Melayu? They wear bad and ugly 
dresses.”61 
In fact, many Chinese who were poor converted to 
Islam.62 Yet, the Chinese converts not only came from 
poor families; some of them were part of the elite. Tjan 
Toe Some, a Sinologue, and Tjan Tjoe Siem, a scholar 
of Islamic and Javanese culture, from Solo, were born 
Muslims.  They studied at Leiden University before 
World War II. Both were descendants of  Chinese Mus-
lims who had come to the archipelago before 1800. 
Among these Chinese who had lived for generations on 
Java was a Chinese Muslim family who aided Prince 
Diponegoro during the Java war (1825-1830) and due 
to their support, Prince Diponegoro granted them land 
in Solo.63
Hamka, a Islamic leader of the Muhammadiyah or-
ganization from Padang, knew some Chinese Muslims 
before the independence period, including two Chi-
nese Muslims who he met in the early 1930s. As Hamka 
became a teacher of  Islam in Ujung Pandang between 
1931-34, he met Tionghoa converts. He remembered 
the two Muslims of Chinese origin named Baba Kasim 
and Baba Bidol. Baba Kasim was well known for his 
ownership of a publishing company which received 
orders from the government. Baba Bidol (Abdullah) 
was an elderly man who had good connections with the 
Bugis people. For Hamka, their conversion to Islam 
increased, rather than reduced their prestige.  Hamka 
admitted that during the colonial era, for a Chinese 
individual to be a Muslim meant to downgrade his or 
herself to an “inlander,” i.e. native, since Chinese in 
general were regarded as higher in status than the na-
tives. But for Islamic leaders such as Hamka, Chinese 
converts were just as  Islamic and nationalist as other 
Muslims and Indonesians. 64
Thus, the Dutch and the Chinese viewed Chinese 
Muslims unfavorably.  During the colonial period, con-
version to Islam for Chinese was viewed as downgrad-
ing one’s  social status.65 Yet, as we shall see in the 
postcolonial era, evidence exists which suggests that 
Islamic leaders viewed Chinese converts to Islam more 
favorably and positively than in earlier periods. Also, 
more Chinese Muslim organizations and figures be-
came increasingly assimilated to Indonesia and became 
vocal in expressing their identities and pursuing their 
specific interests. 
The Experience in Postcolonial Era 
The postcolonial period witnessed more Chinese 
gradually converting to Islam. Many Chinese attempted 
to make some historical reference to the past, to the 
history of Zheng He as a Muslim traveler and perhaps a 
preacher in Indonesia in the 15th century. The post-
colonial Chinese Muslims attempted to assert their 
historical participation in both nationalism and the 
Islamization of the country. They emphasized that 
there existed not only Chinese who converted to Islam 
but also Chinese who had been Muslims before coming 
to Indonesia and had preached Islam there. Some have 
said: “The conversion of Chinese to Islam today is 
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simply to bring back the history;” “Chinese are one 
group of the Indonesian Muslim ancestors;” “The 
Chinese played a very important role in the Islamiza-
tion of Indonesians.”66  It becomes apparent that Chi-
nese Muslims attempted to legitimize their historical 
presence and “indigenousness” within the on-going 
tensions between the local and the non-local in post-
colonial Indonesia. The tensions can be discerned in 
various Chinese figures and associations that devel-
oped in the postcolonial era. 
Abdul Karim Oey and the Chinese 
Muslim Association (PITI)
One of  the prominent Chinese Muslim figures in 
postcolonial Indonesia is  Abdul Karim Oey (originally 
named Oey Tjeng Hien).  Oey Tjeng Hien (1905-1988) 
was a second generation Chinese Indonesian. His par-
ents came from Fujian (Hokkien) Province in southern 
China and had migrated to Indonesia in the mid-
nineteenth century. Oey’s father was a merchant and 
sent him to HCS,  a Dutch school for Chinese children, 
and consequently Oey became an Adventist Christian, 
although he never actually practiced Christianity,  as he 
admitted later. He went into business in Bengkulu. He 
said that his “Chinese soul” and the influence of the 
Minangkabau (Padang) made him want to leave home 
and become a merchant. His work often took him to 
Jakarta. Oey acknowledged that at first he became a 
Buddhist and Confucian. Then he converted to Chris-
tianity.  Oey said that Adventist Christianity did not 
bring him peace. He felt that “the light of God began to 
illuminate his  soul.” He felt drawn to Islam and began 
to study the religion. He converted to Islam at the age 
of 25. Since his religious knowledge was still lacking, 
he studied Islam with a teacher named Fikir Daud. 
After becoming a Muslim, Oey’s relationship with his 
family was becoming more distant. On the other hand, 
his relationship with the local Muslims became closer, 
especially with the Sumatran people in the area he was 
born. He was able to persuade his father to convert as 
well. He became a preacher when he felt that his un-
derstanding of Islam was sufficent. For example, when 
someone wanted to give Oey a zakat (a religious alms/
donation),  he responded: “I am not a muallaf (new 
convert entitled to zakat); I am a Muslim preacher. I 
consider myself as a leader. I am well-to-do and certain 
in my belief in Islam. A Muallaf  still has to be con-
vinced. It would be better to give the zakat to someone 
with a greater claim, a poor person who belongs to one 
of the eight groups entitled zakat.”67
Oey’s identities changed according to political cir-
cumstances. Oey founded a branch of the Muhamma-
diyah organization (established in 1912) in Bintuhan. 
Then he moved to Bengkulu as Muhammadiyah’s con-
sul. He was close to President Soekarno while in exile. 
Oey remained active in the Muhammadiyah during the 
Japanese occupation (1942-45). When Japan surren-
dered, and the Masyumi Party was founded, Oey be-
came party chief in Bengkulu. When the Dutch initi-
ated military action in 1948, Oey and some other fig-
ures became guerilla fighters. Then,  he moved to Ja-
karta and became a member of Majelis Tanwir (Coun-
cil) of  Muhammadiyah (1952-73). Oey was head of the 
Muhammadiyah Economic Council (1964-73). Apart 
from his entrepreneurial activities with other Chinese, 
he also sat on the Masyumi Party Council (1957-60). 
When Masyumi debated the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI),  he sided with the anti-communists be-
cause he felt PKI was anti-Islamic. When Soekarno 
dissolved the Masyumi Party, Oey founded the Organi-
zation of Chinese Muslims of Indonesia (PITI). 68 
Oey and other Chinese Muslims saw that one of the 
ways of asserting Islamic and national identity was 
through the creation of associations. PITI was and is 
still the most prominent one.  The Muslim Chinese 
Union (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa) and The Chinese 
Muslim Union (Persatuan Tionghoa Muslim), which 
were established before independence, merged into a 
new organization called Indonesian Chinese Islamic 
Union (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia, PITI) on 
July 6,  1963. This organization had many branches. 
One of its branches was in Jogjakarta, where Islamic 
propagation among the Chinese was undertaken 
through weekly and monthly Islamic studies. In 1971, 
PITI claimed that its members had reached 100,000 
Chinese Muslims, predominantly in Pontianak and 
Medan. They said that some of the reasons reasons for 
Chinese conversion were self-awareness, love,  and 
economic difficulty, among others.69  A PITI activist 
said that Tionghoa Muslims should find Islam easy to 
observe and should not be shy and hide from showing 
Islamic identity.70  M. Abnar Romli wondered why 
other Chinese should be overwhelmed by those Chi-
nese converting to Islam. He believed that the Chinese 
played a crucial historical role in Islamization and 
Chinese Muslims in Colonial and Postcolonial Indonesia
8! EXPLORATIONS a graduate student journal of southeast asian studies
therefore no one should be surprised by the fact that 
the number of Chinese converting to Islam had now 
increased.71
In 1972, this organization changed its name into The 
Union of  Iman, Tauhid,  and Islam (Persatuan Iman 
Tauhid Islam),  still using the same abbreviation,  PITI, 
but without using Chinese terms. The shift in the name 
of organization showed a shift in identity due to chang-
ing circumstances. The leaders of PITI claimed that by 
dissolving the old organization (with the term Tiong-
hoa) they wanted to allay doubts  about the Islamic 
character of the Chinese Muslims for all parties. They 
believed that Chinese Islam was not unlike native Is-
lam. They also said that this change was to ease the 
process of Chinese assimilating to the native Muslim 
norms. According to one of its leaders, Junus Jahja, the 
change occurred as a response to criticisms against the 
exclusively racial notion that the old PITI title retained. 
Yet, in practice, despite the change, Chinese and non-
Chinese had known before World War II that PITI was 
a unique organization which aimed to promote Islam 
among Indonesian Chinese.72 
It is worth noting that before group leaders changed 
the name, they saw that the use of the term Tionghoa 
had its pros and cons.  Some non-Chinese figures, such 
as Hamka, Rasyidi, Mukhlas Rowi, and Letjen Sudir-
man contended that the word Tionghoa had its  own 
attractiveness. However, according to Tempo  maga-
zine, in some regions, such as Aceh, Sukabumi, Cire-
bon, and Medan, Chinese came to religious meetings 
in abundance, but in other regions such as Solo, the 
term Tionghoa made Chinese individuals worry about 
the old Baperki, a Chinese organization which aimed 
to re-sinicize the Peranakan and to promote Chinese 
nationalism. For the Chinese in Solo,  PITI with a new 
name (without Tionghoa) was more beneficial and 
attractive. 73 Yet, according to Abdul Karim Oey, the 
new name PITI without Tionghoa did not receive the 
expected support and sympathy it had received previ-
ously from the Chinese themselves. 74
Nonetheless, the number of  members gradually in-
creased. In 1988, Junus Jahja estimated that there were 
some 50 Chinese Muslim preachers in Indonesia and 
some 50,000 Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. The 
preachers included the young Burnadi (Tjhia Sin Hak) 
and Alifuddin El Islamy (Sim Song Thian). Burnadi was 
32 years old that year and had converted to Islam at the 
age of 18 before going to high school.  He came to Java 
and studied at the Islamic boarding school (pesantren) 
Gontor in East Java for seven years. Burnadi  continued 
his studies at the State Institute for Islamic Studies 
(IAIN) Sunan Ampel in Surabaya. Alifuddin was an-
other preacher who graduated from IAIN in Palem-
bang, Sumatera. 75 Of course, Islamic leaders tended to 
welcome the conversion of Chinese to Islam and the 
increased in numbers of Chinese preachers. The Is-
lamic leader Hamka, for example, noted about Abdul 
Karim Oey, “He was a Muslim and a son of Indone-
sia…who was fostered,  nurtured, and became a true 
Indonesian nationalist.”76  Thus,  Chinese Muslims 
became increasingly assimilated to the local culture.
After Oey’s death in 1988, to maintain the goal of 
Islamization among the Chinese, the followers of Ab-
dul Karim Oey established The Foundation of Haji 
Abdul Karim Oey on 9 April 1991.  To include Oey after 
the Islamic terms Abdul Karim (thus, Abdul Karim 
Oey) in the name of the foundation was intentional;  it 
was again to facilitate rapprochement between the eth-
nic Chinese and the Muslims. It was also used to attract 
new converts and to allow new converts to learn Islam 
together with other Chinese.77  The Mosque of 
“Lautze” was built at Pecinan (Chinatown) in Jakarta. 
Younger Chinese were now involved. H.M. Syafi’i  
Antonio from an Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat, for 
example, headed the Business Contacts of Haji Abdul 
Karim Oey.78
Some Indonesians asked why Chinese Muslims main-
tained, rather than dissolved, PITI as an “exclusive” 
Chinese Muslim organization.  In an article in 1987,  
Junus Jahja tried to answer the question. He observed 
that the majority of Chinese in Indonesia who con-
verted to Islam intended to be engaged in the Islamic 
community without overtly expressing their ethnicity. 
The so-called “Chinese problem” should have ended 
with conversion to Islam. To show one’s Chinese iden-
tity would undo the “smooth” assimilation process that 
had already taken place. Junus Jahja believed that by 
becoming Muslim an ethnic Chinese in Indonesia had 
automatically become “totally assimilated to or mixed 
with the community without any trace.” Although Is-
lam allows a person to assert his or her ethnic or racial 
identity,  the actual fact is that Muslim Chinese pre-
ferred to mix with the community so that they could act 
and be treated just like others.  However, Junus Jahja 
went on to argue, there was a tendency for new con-
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verts to want to go along first with their fellow con-
verts. They still needed some kind of communal iden-
tity. They had known that PITI was an organization of 
such Chinese Muslims. If a Chinese Indonesian wanted 
to become Muslim, he or she could come to PITI and 
be among other Chinese Muslims. Therefore, Junus 
argued, PITI was and remains necessary for Chinese 
Muslims seeking guidance and protection. PITI was 
like an Islamic research center whose specialization 
was Chinese studies. Along with such Islamic organiza-
tions as Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912), Nahdlatul 
Ulama (1926), Al-Irsyad, Ittihadul Muballighin, and 
others, PITI had the religious duty to propagate Islam 
among the some 5 million Chinese then living 
throughout Indonesia.79 
Along with PITI, there was another association called 
the Universal Blessing Foundation, Yayasan Rahmat 
Semesta, established on 22 June 1979, which was aimed 
at facilitating financial support for the program aimed 
at assimilating Tionghoa to Islam. This  foundation, 
like others, made references to the history of Islam in 
Indonesia (Zheng He/Sam Po as  pious Muslim, Raden 
Patah as founder of  the Demak Kingdom, and Chinese 
Muslim Generals such as  Soekarno’s ministers). They 
also believed that Islam was the religion of the ances-
tors of Indonesians and was rooted in Indonesia. They 
would use various means of dissemination of Islam, 
including the film entitled “The Message,” TV, radio, 
the press, books, brochures, and pamphlets.80
The above description about Abdul Karim Oey and 
his association (PITI) indicates that Chinese Muslims 
after independence began to perceive themselves as 
both “nationalist” and “Islamic”, although their Chi-
nese identity remained intact. Chinese Muslim assimi-
lationist movements cannot be separated from wider 
assimilationist movements in the country which in-
cluded Chinese from different religions too. One such 
assimilationist movement was Bakom, the Communi-
cative Body of Understanding of National Unity. 
Communicative Body for the National 
Unity (BAKOM-PKB)
Based on the 1928 Youth Oath (one country, one 
nation, one language:  Indonesia), some 30 Chinese 
leaders held a meeting in Ambarawa on January 15, 
1961. They formulated The Charter of Assimilation. 
According to this group, assimilation has a general and 
specific definition.  The common definition of assimi-
lation is a process of assimilating groups who have 
different mental attitude, customs, and cultural expres-
sions to a meaningful sociological unity in one nation, 
Indonesia. The specific definition of assimilation in 
relation to the descendants of Tionghoais the accep-
tance of the descendants  of  Tionghoaby the local peo-
ple so that a distinct Chinese identity no longer exists. 
Since 1966, the assimilation was becoming a normal 
order of life, either through spontaneous assimilation 
of the millions of Chinese who converted to Christian-
ity, or assimilation stimulated by the government which 
undertook measures to eliminate the separate Chinese 
“identity.” This included the suppression of Chinese 
schools; interdiction of using the term Tionghoa and 
obligation of utilizing Cina, an Indonesianized term for 
China; very strict limitation of  all cultural manifesta-
tions of Chineseness (and prohibition of all the relig-
ious festivals outside the temples); obligation of choos-
ing an “Indonesian” name. Even the ancient Chinese 
architecture was challenged to the extent that typically 
Chinese structures started to disappear. 81 
Within this context, K. Sindhunatha, a Christian, the 
chief of Communicative Body for the Appreciation of 
National Unity (BAKOM-PKB) welcomed the conver-
sion of some Tionghoa people to Islam as well as to 
other religions. He argued that the assimilation of the 
Tionghoa people should take place in all fields: politi-
cal, legal,  social,  cultural, etc. The terms pribumi (lo-
kal) and non-pribumi (non-local) should disappear 
from everyday life. Assimilation could be done through 
churches, mosques, and so forth.  Assimilation could 
mean an adaptation to a religion adhered to by the local 
people based on individual faith. Sindhunata said that 
Islam is a good religion, and it teaches solidarity be-
cause all Muslims are brothers. Thus, in Solo, a Tiong-
hoa should assimilate to Javanese,  in Parahyangan, he 
should assimilate to Sundanese, in Minahasa to Ka-
wanua, etc. 82
Although BAKOM-PKB was not exclusively a relig-
ious organization, and it did not intend to give privi-
lege to one religion over another, it celebrated differ-
ent religious holidays with other institutions. One of 
the religious holidays that BAKOM-PKB held was the 
Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday (Maulid Nabi), to-
gether with PITI in 1980. Thus,  BAKOM-PKB was an 
organization that could also accommodate the needs of 
some Chinese Muslims. 83 
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BAKOM-PKB had its own journal called Pembauran 
(Assimilation), providing a voice for Chinese problems 
and grievances. Stuart William Greif argued that to 
counter-balance the predominantly Roman Catholic 
nature of the leadership of young, successful, and pro-
fessional Chinese Indonesians,  Pembaruan stressed 
the desirability of  Islamizing the Chinese as a final step 
in assimilation.84 It published a book entitled “Assimi-
lation and Islam” (Asimilasi dan Islam) in 1981, which 
compiled a number of reports  and articles on the issue 
of Islam and assimilation.85 
Bakom encouraged assimilation by way of changing 
Chinese names to local names.  This practice was also 
encouraged, if not required, by the government. 
Soekarno’s government issued decree Number 4/1961 
regarding the changing and adding of family names. 
The decree stated that an Indonesian citizen could only 
change or add his or her name by asking permission 
from the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice 
had the right to reject the change if  the name proposed 
contradicted customary law. Soeharto,  then the cabinet 
presidium, reasserted the right to change names, by 
issuing a decree on 27 December 1966 on a similar 
matter, but more specifically on Chinese naming. The 
decree stated that an Indonesian citizen who uses a 
personal or familiar Chinese name who wants to re-
place his or her name with a commonly used Indone-
sian name, can express his or her will in a written letter 
to the local regents. It stated that the names chosen 
should not violate any local customary law.86 Conse-
quently, some Chinese did change their Chinese 
names. Thus, Ateng Kho Tjeng Lie became Ateng 
Suripto, Tjia Dji Siong became Darma Sutjiadi, Tjan 
Hok Soei  became Harry Tjan Silalahi, etc.87  One of 
those Chinese who changed their names and became a 
prominent figure after Abdul Karim Oey was Junus 
Jahja.
One of the Chinese who changed his name even be-
fore converting to Islam was Lauw Chuan Tho, born in 
1927 in Batavia/Jakarta. His father, Lau Lok Soei, was 
the head of a Chinese community in Jatinegara, Ja-
karta. His mother, Oei Ay Nio, came from Central Java 
and played a Javanese musical instrument (gamelan). 
Lauw’s parents sent him to HCS, a school for Chinese 
children and then to MULO during the Japanese occu-
pation. After graduating from AMS (high school), 
Lauw went to the Netherlands to pursue an economic 
degree and graduated in 1959. Lauw learned Indone-
sian language autodidactically and managed to show 
that he was among the few Chinese who spoke Indone-
sian at that time in the Netherlands. There, in 1952, 
Lauw initiated the abolition of an Ethnic Chinese or-
ganization called Chung Hua Hui because, as he saw it, 
the organization was exclusive while Indonesia had just 
gained independence in 1945. Instead, Lauw joined an 
Indonesian Student Association (Persatuan Pelajar 
Indonesia) in the Netherlands. When he returned to 
Indonesia, Lauw actively engaged in movements 
against Baperki, an organization based on Chinese 
ethnicity/nationalism, founded in 1954.  Then, Lauw 
and others signed Charter of Assimilation (Assimila-
tion Statement) in 1961. He became a member of As-
similation Committee, then of the Communicative 
Body for Understanding of National Unity (BAKOM), 
and a few other assimilation organizations.88
Tempo Magazine in its July 14th 1979 edition, re-
ported the story of how Lauw Chuan Tho adopted an 
Islamic name, Junus Jahja, before he became a Muslim. 
He was not really sure about why he chose that name. 
He converted to Islam at the age of 52 at the Mosque of 
Al-Azhar,  Jakarta.  He met with Muljadi Djojomartono, 
the Minister of Social Affairs during President 
Soekarno’s era and a major Muhammadiyah figure, 
who was his classmate in the Netherlands. When he 
declared his new religion, some Chinese doubted his 
seriousness.  People wondered if he converted to Islam 
merely for the purpose of assimilation. Junus Jahja 
refuted that accusation and argued that he converted to 
Islam because he was interested in the Islamic idea of 
brotherhood, not simply because he wanted to assimi-
late with Indonesian culture. He added that there had 
been many Muslims in China and that the Prophet Mu-
hammad was reported to have urged Muslims to seek 
knowledge even in China.89 
When asked in 1979, Junus Jahja replied that he was a 
Muslim, an Indonesian,  and a Tionghoa descendent. 
He said he did not want to deny his “Chineseness” and 
“Islamicness.” He stressed that all Muslims are broth-
ers. He said, “I also believe that to be a Muslim is to 
love his country, and in Islam, the love for country is 
part of the faith (hubbul watan min al-iman).”90  Hav-
ing changed his name to Junus Jahja in 1962 and then 
converting to Islam in 1979, he made his pilgrimage to 
Mecca in 1980. Jahja was recruited to be a board mem-
ber of the Indonesian Council for Islamic Clerics (Ma-
jelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1980 and remained in 
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that position until 1990. He was also an activist of the 
Muhammadiyah. He believed that Muhammadiyah 
would provide religious and economic service to Mus-
lims,  without discrimination. He agreed with what 
George Kahin of Cornell University had said about the 
organization, namely that Muhammadiyah was founded 
on modernist Islamic ideas and had a broad range of 
social services: clinics, poverty relief,  orphanages,  
publishing, libraries, and schools. 91 
Junus Jahja was involved in what he called “social 
engineering” to improve the economy of Islamic com-
munity and at the same time to seek for rapprochement 
between the Chinese businessmen and the grass root 
local community.  In 1992, he was on the advisory board 
of the Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals 
(ICMI).92 Furthermore, he was a prolific writer on the 
Chinese question and assimilation in Indonesia. His 
works included “Racial Line is Old-fashioned: Toward 
Assimilation” published in 1983,  and “New Hope for 
Chinese Descents” in 1984.93 As for his ideas on “total 
assimilation,” the following statement he made is 
worth quoting:
...by embracing Islam young ethnic Chinese experi-
enced that immediately they are fully accepted as 
fellow-Muslims and compatriots by the people at 
large who are 90 percent Muslims. All kinds of 
hostility and controversy as an inheritance of the 
past disappear. They are heartily welcomed now 
and totally assimilated into the community. So they 
have at last a permanent ‘place in the sun’. This is 
exactly what ethnic Chinese are so looking and 
longing for. 94 
Junus Jahja observed that some Chinese Muslims 
remained “lonely Muslims.” When local Muslims cele-
brated the Islamic Holiday of Idul Fitri with their fami-
lies and neighbors, many Chinese Muslims did not 
have fellow Chinese Muslims in their family or neigh-
borhood. There were still “lonely Muslims” because 
their wife or husband or neighbor was not Muslim.  
Junus Jahja therefore suggested that the new converts 
can celebrate the holiday with the greater Muslim fam-
ily as brothers or adopted children so that they no 
longer experienced loneliness. Junus Jahja himself 
claimed that he never felt lonely as a Muslim because 
he had had many local colleagues and friends, non-
Muslim and Muslim, Chinese and non-Chinese. 95 
 Jahja’s idea of assimilation was well accepted among 
other Chinese Muslims. For example, Hasan Widjaja 
supported the notion that without becoming Muslim, 
assimilation would not be comprehensive. Hasan Wid-
jaja sustained an Indonesian Islam in the sense that the 
preaching of Islam and nationalism became insepara-
ble. He called the attempt “patriotic Islamization.” 96 
Another important figure in the Chinese Muslim 
circles is Masagung (Tjio Wie Tay) who was born in 
Batavia in 1927. He is the founder of the large publish-
ing company Gunung Agung. He took the local name 
Masagung in 1962. He had close connections with then 
President Soekarno, and his companies included the 
publishing company Haji Masagung.97  With support 
from Soekarno, Haji Masagung established Sedayu 
Foundation (Yayasan Sedayu) in Jakarta in 1966. His 
businesses also included Gunung Agung,  Sari Agung, 
Inti Idayu Press, Jaya Mandarin Agung, and Ayumas 
Gunung Agung. 98 
In the 1970s, when he approaching the age of 50 and 
had reached the peak of his success, Masagung experi-
enced a kind of crisis  of conscience. He came across 
Mrs.  Tien Fuad Muntaco, an expert in hypnotism and 
telepathy, and Masagung fell under her spiritual influ-
ence and decided to convert to Islam (before, he had 
adopted Hinduism) and established the Foundation of 
Clear Path (Yayasan Jalan Terang) aimed at financing 
the construction of a mosque, a hospital, and a mu-
seum of the Nine Saints (Wali Sanga). Masagung also 
participated in the preaching of Islam in diverse 
mosques in Jakarta. Masagung purposefully chose 
assimilation. 99 President Soeharto was glad to hear that 
more Chinese, including Masagung, became Muslim 
because their conversion would make assimilation into 
the Indonesian population easier.100 
Hembing Wijayakusuma was another prominent 
Chinese Muslim, one who possessed a unique skill: 
acupuncture. Hembing Wijayakusuma was born in 
1940 in Medan, Sumatra. His mother helped the guer-
illa fighters against the Dutch colonial regime. The 
majority of the natives at Pasar Belakang, Medan, 
where he lived,  were Muslim. Hembing learned Islam 
from a local Islamic teacher. He was taught how to 
practice Chinese medicine from his  early years by his 
grandfather,  but he read books from a variety of 
sources as well, such as the writings of  Thomas Alva 
Edison, Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein, and other in-
ventors. He studied at the Chinese Medicine Institute 
in Hong Kong and after graduating he taught at the 
University of Sumatera Utama and then moved to Ja-
karta. Hembing became actively involved in health 
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activities as well as Islamic activities;  he believed that 
Islam taught a healthy life. Chinese acupuncturists 
greatly influenced his knowledge and skills. Regarding 
his Chinese identity, he acknowledged that he was of 
Chinese descent. He felt that assimilation among the 
Chinese population was still a big problem, but he 
believed Islam recognized all ethnicities without dis-
crimination. Although Hembing himself was a Muslim, 
he did not believe that everyone should follow his path. 
To assimilate into Indonesian society, Chinese did not 
need to become Muslim. His inclusive understanding 
of Islam was different from that of his fellow Chinese 
Muslims such as Abdul Karim Oey and Junus Jahja. For 
Hembing, Indonesia was a multicultural and multi-
religious nation,  so there was no obligation for Chi-
nese to become Muslim simply to assimilate in Indone-
sia, but instead Indonesians should recognize all ethnic 
groups without discrimination.101  In this regard, 
Hembing was also influenced by his understanding of 
the historical figure Zheng He, the 15th century sailor 
and a delegate of the Ming Dynasty to the Indonesian 
archipelago. He wrote, “The main goal of Zheng He’s 
sailing was to introduce Islam to the Chinese and the 
natives in the archipelago. But Zheng He never im-
posed Islam on the natives. He respected the religions 
of the natives. In Tiongkok, Zheng He respected Bud-
dha, Confucianism, and others.” 102
Instead of promoting Islam for all Chinese, Hembing 
Wijayakusuma promoted the pluralist ideology of Pan-
casila, the five pillars of state ideology,  which recog-
nizes belief in one God, humanity, national unity,  de-
mocracy based on representative government, and 
social justice. Hembing interpreted the first pillar,  
belief in one God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) in ref-
erence to Chinese thought. He said that Tai Chi Chuan 
is  derived from uchi which means emptiness.  From 
uchi comes Tai Chi. The existence of  emptiness is be-
fore Yin-Yang and the symbol of Tai Chi is Ying-Yang, 
the balanced forces of night and day, positive and nega-
tive, male and female, etc.103 
Hembing noted that assimilation had taken place in 
Indonesia for centuries. He pointed to the stories by 
Zheng He’s companions who came and wrote about 
the 15th century Javanese community they encountered. 
He also mentioned other historical evidence indicating 
the harmonious relations between the Chinese and the 
natives. In 1998, Hembing supported the policy issued 
by President B.J. Habibie to remove the distinction 
between pribumi and non-pribumi and to promote fair 
and just treatment for all. 104 
The tragedy of May 12-14, 1998, in which many Chi-
nese were victimized in Jakarta and other cities in In-
donesia, was a shock for many Chinese people in the 
country because the distinction was reinforced again 
between pribumi (local, indigenous) and non-pribumi 
(non-local). The Chinese were treated very severely in 
these riots. Hembing contended that these riots should 
be a lesson that the people who live in Indonesia should 
be tolerant and should recognize the Indonesian slogan 
“diversity in unity” (Bhineka Tunggal Ika).  By his  
involvement in cross-religious and cross-ethnic activi-
ties, Hembing intended to accommodate different In-
donesians regardless of race and religion.
Another Chinese convert was a female badminton 
national player, Verawati  Fajrin, who converted to 
Islam in 1979 and went to Mecca on the pilgrimage,  
coordinated by the Islamic Brotherhood Foundation 
and Indonesian Council of  Clerics (MUI). The head of 
MUI Hasan Basri welcomed her conversion to Islam. 
“By becoming a Muslim,” Hasan Basri  said, “Verawati 
no longer belongs to her race or origin, but she is  now 
in one Islamic brotherhood.” 105
Some Reasons for Chinese 
Conversion to Islam 
The Siauw Giap, a Sinologue at Leiden recorded his 
prediction for the relationship between Islam and Chi-
nese in Indonesia in 1965: 
When the legacies from the colonial past, which 
tend to impair group relations in contemporary 
Indonesia will be wholly removed and an economic 
development takes place which affords a fair share 
to both ethnic Chinese and Indonesians, it is impos-
sible that Islam will again attract Chinese converts 
and the parallel in the history of religions in Thai-
land and Java be restored.106 
The Siauw Giap claimed that Chinese became Muslim 
merely because of  political situations. In fact, there 
were different reasons why the Chinese converted to 
Islam. 
According to a research carried out in 1984 by Keun 
Won-Jang in Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Semarang, and Su-
rakarta, most of the Chinese who converted to Islam 
did so because they were motivated by the wish to free 
themselves from the status of being non-pribumi (non-
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native). Another factor was political:  the search for 
security.  They became Muslim because they wanted to 
be safe from tensions caused by perceptions of ethnic 
differences. For example, after the anti-Chinese riots 
in Surakarta which spread to several towns in 1980, 
many Chinese converted to Islam. Apart from the po-
litical factor, there was also a religious factor. Many 
converted to Islam because of its teachings, but this 
conversion usually happened in the elite circles. An-
other reason was marriage: if a young Chinese man 
wishes to marry a Muslim girl, he has to first convert to 
Islam. 107  In some cases, Chinese men who wished to 
marry an Indonesian woman could do so by the “nomi-
nal” adoption of Islam. One could become a Muslim by 
pronouncing the Shahadah (confession of faith), and 
by circumcision which is considered a crucial symbol of 
conversion. Full religious assimilation could come 
later, after formal conversion. 108 
Yet, a purely religious reason cannot be marginal-
ized.  An example of a religious reason is evident when 
a Chinese convert said, “In mosques, there is  no Chi-
nese, no Javanese, no poor, no rich; everybody is  the 
same, bowing their body to one God, and sitting 
equally.”109  Anti-discriminatory elements in Islamic 
teaching are believed to be appealing to some Chinese. 
For these Chinese, conversion to Islam was not simply 
nominal. 
After converting to Islam, some Chinese still main-
tained at least a few Chinese characteristics. One of the 
reasons why some Chinese Muslims could not com-
pletely eliminate their “ethnic” identity was the belief 
that their new religion recognized descent-based iden-
tifications (such as ethnicity),  as well as territory-based 
identifications (such as nationalism). Thus, at least for 
some of the postcolonial Chinese Muslim figures, it 
was possible and desirable to be Chinese, to be Mus-
lim, and to be Indonesian at the same time. For them 
ethnicity, religion, and nationalism were not incom-
patible. 
Chinese Muslims in Post-Soeharto Era 
 Since the downfall of the former President Soeharto 
in 1998, a political shift has occurred in Indonesia, and 
restrictions on Chinese culture have begun to lift. In 
1999, President Habibie published his biography with a 
Chinese translation, aimed at bridging the gap between 
Indonesia and China. 110 Since 1999, Chinese Indone-
sians have begun to openly celebrate the Chinese New 
Year or Imlek,  and shopping malls are decked out in 
red and gold lanterns every New Year. Chinese-
language newspapers have hit the streets and Metro 
television, owned by a Peranakan Chinese,  Surya Pa-
loh, broadcasts the news several times a day in 
Putonghua,  a Chinese language. Several Chinese po-
litical parties have been founded: the Indonesia Diver-
sity Party (PBI), the Tionghoa Reform Party (Parti),  the 
Indonesian Assimilation Party (Parpindo).111 A group of 
Chinese-Indonesian professionals also launched a pri-
vate think tank called the Center for National Affairs 
(Elkasa) aimed at developing pluralism, human rights 
and democracy. 112 In 2000, former President Abdur-
rahman Wahid lifted the legal ban on Confucianism 
with Decree No. 6 on Chinese religion, belief, and 
cultures.113  In 2001, President Megawati Soekarnopu-
tri, represented by the Minister of Religious Affairs,  
issued Decree no. 13, stipulating that the Lunar Chi-
nese New Year, or Imlek, was a national holiday.114
How have Chinese Muslims responded to the Indo-
nesian government’s relaxation of restrictions on Chi-
nese culture, and the Chinese cultural revival that has 
resulted as a consequence? One of  the responses to 
this question was given by Junus Jahja. He welcomed 
the retraction of restrictions against the Chinese in 
general. He felt that the cries and complaints among 
the Peranakan Chinese about the government’s dis-
crimination against the Chinese population cannot be 
simply be seen from only a Chinese point of view. Many 
indigenous groups have also experienced the same 
discrimination. For example, Junus Jahja, argued: 
The exclusive housing of the Chinese community 
will pose no problem if the indigenous group could 
afford to buy the same housing following the redis-
tribution of economic resources. On the other hand, 
Chinese-Indonesians will gain proper access to 
political institutions to voice their aspirations. 
Therefore, both groups are actually practicing dis-
crimination in terms of resources under control. 
The government has a very important role in the 
discrimination through political and economic poli-
cies. Lingering discriminative practices will only 
create tension between the groups in our society.115 
Perceptions and attitudes of other Chinese Muslims, 
who now number more than 50,000, (if we believe the 
popular estimation),  remain to be examined. But it is 
fair to say at this  point that Chinese who converted to 
Islam are still at a crossroads, because on the one hand 
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their conversion is welcomed by the government and 
the majority Muslim population,  but on the other hand, 
they are beginning to have more space for public cul-
tural expression. 
Conclusions 
Chinese Muslims have become part of the local 
population since the pre-colonial period. Some had 
converted to Islam before their arrival in the archipel-
ago, but most did not convert until they became “lo-
cal.” Thus, Islam was considered primarily as part of 
local,  rather than world,  religion. After Indonesian 
independence in 1945, a growing number of migrants 
and their children had chosen to identify with the land 
where they lived, to become like other 
“Indonesians.”116  In the context of world history,  it was 
only after World War II, when further migration had 
been cut off and Chinese migrants around the world 
were there to stay, that Chinese identities appropriate 
to pluralist nationalist polities  began to be negotiated, 
usually in some sort of  “hybrid” formulation such as 
Chinese-Indonesian (called Peranakan). Such identi-
ties were predicated on the idea that it is  possible to be 
Chinese and still be part of a national community.  And 
among these Chinese, one means of assimilating to the 
local or national community has been to adopt the re-
ligion of the majority: Islam. 
According to Adam McKeown, the emergence of 
Chinese minorities within a new national community is 
best approached from an “ethnic” rather than a “di-
asporic” perspective. He argues that the “ethnic” per-
spective is an area in which identity and meaning of  
being Chinese is most strongly formed by local social 
relations, where “Chineseness” becomes a heritage, a 
political status, or merely a color of skin.117 Thus, some 
Chinese Muslims retained part of their Chinese names, 
while adopting new ones. Some Chinese Muslims be-
came interested in knowing more about the fifteenth-
century-Chinese Muslim figure, Zheng He. Most of 
these Chinese were also merchants as well as practic-
ing preachers. As Abdul Karim Oey said, his “Chinese 
soul” made him leave his  home in Padang and become 
a merchant. The label Tionghoa Keturunan, or “Chi-
nese descendant”, even after conversion to Islam and 
claims of assimilation, remains in common parlance. 
These all seem to suggest that a Chinese person who 
embraced Islam could never forget that he or she is  of 
Chinese descent, and the people around them still tend 
to look at him or her as “Chinese.”
 However, Chinese Muslims in modern Indonesia 
can be viewed as being “post-diasporic” for a number 
of reasons. In the Chinese Diaspora,  China became the 
core,  and the host land was the periphery. In the post-
diaspora, it was the reverse: the host land or their 
adopted country was the core and China became the 
periphery. In the Diaspora, the Chinese tended to look 
back to the Chinese past, whereas in post-diaspora, the 
Chinese tended to see themselves  in and for the pre-
sent and perhaps the future. In addition, in the Dias-
pora, Chinese populations had a strong connection 
with or attachment to the homeland,  the Chinese past, 
ancestors,  etc. However, in post-diaspora they tended 
to have a weak attachment to the homeland. Thus, Chi-
nese Muslims who were born in Indonesia spoke 
Malay/Indonesian and/or other local languages such 
as Javanese or Sundanese,  behaved according to local 
customs and wore local dress.  A number of Chinese 
Muslims who were active in associations also tended to 
challenge and counter others’ perceptions that they 
were still Chinese,  not “pure Indonesians” or not 
“pure Islamic.” This “post-diasporic consciousness” 
becomes no less ambiguous and dilemmatic than the 
“diasporic one”.118
The case of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia provides 
us with some insights on the question of multiple coex-
isting identities of  nationalism, religion and ethnicity 
within the context of diaspora and post-diaspora.119 It 
also supports the notion that identity is socially con-
structed, and it is  constructed not only by external 
circumstances but also by individuals  or groups 
themselves.120  The expressions of “Chinese-ness,” 
“Islamic-ness,” and “Indonesian-ness” are revealed in 
different contexts, but suggest that there is a keener 
sense of the nuances of multiple identities and an en-
hancement of individual and communal self-
consciousness within constantly changing circum-
stances.
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